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Monetary policy has come a long way in the past quarter century. Price stability has
always been part of the Federal Reserve’s policy mandate. Should the Fed now adopt
explicit numerical guidelines or targets for inflation?
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We have gained important insights about
the tactics of monetary policy as we have
moved from an environment of mod-
erate inflation to one of price stability.
In particular, we have learned a good
deal about the benefits of maintaining
appropriate flexibility when implement-
ing policy. We also have learned about
the importance of communications and
transparency in that implementation—
notably their role in reducing the un-
certainty that households and business
owners face when making economic
decisions, such as how much to spend,
save, and invest, or what prices to charge
for their products.1
Some argue that the best way for central
banks to increase transparency and re-
duce this uncertainty is by adopting
explicit numerical guidelines or tar-
gets for inflation.2 However, a number
of questions remain regarding the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of explicit
numerical regimes.
The context
It is pretty much accepted now by econ-
omists that monetary policy—meaning
the Federal Reserve’s ability to influence
interest rates by raising or lowering the
borrowing rate offered to banks—can-
not permanently alter the unemploy-
ment rate or growth rate of the economy.
Economic research indicates that at-
tempts by monetary policy to push
unemployment below its natural, or
equilibrium, rate eventually lead to
pressures on resources and rising infla-
tion and inflationary expectations. The
unemployment rate will need to return
to its equilibrium level (or the natural
rate) in order to stabilize inflation.
Nonetheless, the Humphrey–Hawkins Act
of 1978 explicitly mandated the Federal
Reserve to achieve the dual targets of low
inflation and maximum employment.
When the law was enacted, the natural
rate hypothesis was not as widely accepted
as it is now. Furthermore, the Humphrey–
Hawkins Act set the following targets
for unemployment and inflation to be
reached within five years of the act’s
passage: The unemployment rate would
be below 3% for those older than 19,
and it would be below 4% for those 16
years old and up; also, Consumer Price
Index (CPI) inflation would be under
4%. The law further stated that by 1988
the inflation rate was to be zero.
Well, the unemployment rate did not
drop to 4% by 1983, and the inflation
rate was not down to zero by 1988. For-
tunately, by this time we had learned
enough about the inner workings of
our economy to realize that monetary
policy alone could neither achieve nor
sustain such targets.
Now, no one on the Federal Reserve’s
Open Market Committee (the FOMC)3
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However, FOMC members have ex-
pressed a variety of views on numerical
inflation measures. Some have suggested
an explicit inflation guideline. But no
one has proposed full-blown inflation
targeting, with which we would commit
to set policy with the sole aim of achieving
a particular numerical inflation rate
within some predetermined period.
What should the number be?
There are many issues that need to be
studied and questions to be answered
about both the usefulness and the prac-
tical application of any numerical guide-
line for inflation. The first problem is
deciding what the number should be.
Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Alan Greenspan offered the following
non-explicit definition of price stability:
when households and business owners
are not taking inflation into account in
their economic decisions. This is a use-
ful definition, but it does not easily trans-
late into a particular number for an
inflation guideline.
Indeed, as recent history shows, deciding
on a number for policy to aim for—let
alone figuring out whether it represents
price stability—has been the subject of
a good deal of debate among policy-
makers and economists. There was little
debate in the late 1980s. Inflation was
around 4.5% and looked to be heading
up—most observers viewed this trend
as undesirable. However, there was a
debate in 1994. Core CPI inflation then
was a relatively low 2.8%, and according
to the minutes and transcripts of the
monthly FOMC meetings, inflation was
heading higher than most FOMC partici-
pants wanted. But that view was not uni-
versal. Many economists thought an
inflation rate of 3% was satisfactory and
the Fed should not try to reduce it.4
Today, given the relatively low inflation
we have witnessed in recent years, it is
doubtful many people would find 3%
to be an acceptable point estimate for
an inflation guideline.
Of course, it is possible for inflation to
be too low. Importantly, because nominal
interest rates cannot go below zero—
investors must be compensated in some
way for the use of their money—extreme-
ly low inflation would mean the Fed
could be limited in its ability to lower
short-term real interest rates. Then, the
Fed would have to turn to alternative
and largely untested methods if it
needed to respond to negative shocks
to the economy.
Which measure should be used?
A second problem is which particular
measure of inflation to use. The Con-
sumer Price Index, the Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures Price Index, and
the gross domestic product (GDP) price
index are among the better known mea-
sures, but there are others.5
When inflation rates are high, it typically
does not matter which index is selected
for the guideline because all measures
of inflation will be high and above the
guideline. But when inflation is in the
range of price stability, the choice of the
index could matter. Indeed, seemingly
small differences in the composition of
consumption baskets and other measure-
ment methods, in principle, mean that
different indexes could send mixed sig-
nals to policymakers about the appro-
priate direction policy should take.
There are other issues with regard to the
choice of the guideline index. According
to the Fed, the CPI for personal consump-
tion expenditures, excluding food and
energy, is the best measure of underlying
trends in consumer inflation. But does
that mean it is also the best index to use
as a guideline? After all, the total CPI
is used in many private contracts, as well
as in the inflation adjustments in many
tax and transfer programs. So, should
there be a guideline for the total CPI as
well? Also, in a period of rapidly rising
energy costs—such as the present—will
the public have confidence in an inflation
guideline that excludes energy prices?
Would such a guideline achieve its
claimed advantages of anchoring expec-
tations and reducing risk premiums?
A single number versus a range
Another issue to be considered is the
best way to specify the numerical guide-
line to anchor inflation expectations.
Should it be a single hard number or
should it be a range of inflation out-
comes? And once that has been decided,
what is the time frame for achieving
and maintaining the numerical values?
The problem is to come up with some-
thing practical, yet still informative.
The advantage of a single number is that
it is precise, so it is clear how far inflation
is from the guideline. However, actual
inflation will inevitably fluctuate, and a
range of acceptable inflation outcomes
might make more sense. It would be
more feasible to achieve inflation rates
within a range. Of course, then there is
the issue of how wide the range should
be. A very wide range would be unin-
formative and, therefore, not a useful
starting point.
With either a single number or a range,
however, there are difficulties in com-
municating policy. In the first instance,
the difficulty would be communicating
what kinds of small deviations from the
single number policymakers would be
willing to ignore. In the second case, it
would be communicating what kinds of
deviations within the range would re-
quire a reaction by policymakers. We do
not want to create the impression that
there is necessarily a “zone of indiffer-
ence” for inflation whenever it is in the
guideline range. In either case, we would
face the challenge of explaining the role
of economic conditions in determining
why sometimes the FOMC acts and
other times it does not.
Furthermore, any policy prescription
needs to include a period for evaluating
the inflation outcome against the infla-
tion guideline. Empirical evidence in-
dicates that monetary policy does not
affect the trajectory of inflation before
one year, or more likely, two years. So, it
would be impractical to specify too short
of a time period to reach the guideline.
In contrast, a very long period, say ten to
20 years, would be of dubious value to
households and business owners in their
financial planning. Many central banks
that have inflation guidelines evaluate
the process “over the medium term.” It
is difficult to say precisely what this
means. Is it three years, or five, or ten?
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Dual mandate
The time frame decision becomes even
more complicated when one considers
another important issue: the Fed’s dual
mandate. We are charged with foster-
ing both price stability and maximum
employment. We take the latter to mean
employment associated with maximum
sustainable growth. How does our eco-
nomic growth mandate interact with a
elaboration before they can be of prac-
tical use to policymakers. Suppose, for
the sake of argument, that the natural
rate of unemployment and the level of
potential real GDP were known. The key
question in formulating explicit guide-
lines in the context of the dual mandate
has two parts: “How fast should we plan
to close the deviation in inflation from
price stability?” and “How fast should
of the dual mandate, would this even-
tually lead to adding numerical unem-
ployment guidelines that—like those in
the Humphrey–Hawkins legislation—
would prove to be incompatible with
the natural rate hypothesis? Finally, how
do we best explain flexible targeting to
the public? It seems that whenever a
number is mentioned, the news media
focus entirely on the number and fail
to explain all of the caveats.
This brings me to a final question. Sup-
pose a central bank successfully adopted
a formal inflation guideline that respect-
ed a dual mandate by flexibly adjusting
the time horizons for achieving both
its guidelines. Would this policy look
any different from current Fed policy?
Some academics who study inflation-
targeting central banks say no.6 They
say that, effectively, the Federal Reserve
does engage in flexible inflation target-
ing. This is a bit puzzling, since there are
no announced explicit guidelines. Still,
financial markets and the public do not
seem to be overly bothered by the lack
of an explicit number for future infla-
tionary expectations, and at the present
time, inflationary expectations are well
anchored. Our actual policy appears to
There is not a pressing need to make a decision on inflation
guidelines one way or the other. However, the topic is one of
the most important issues currently on the table regarding
the appropriate strategies for conducting monetary policy.
numerical guideline for inflation? As
seen with the Humphrey–Hawkins Act,
achieving explicit fixed guidelines for
unemployment or real GDP growth is
not workable in practice. Theoretically,
the equilibrium, or natural, rate of un-
employment and the trend in potential
GDP growth change over time with de-
mographics, productivity trends, and
other factors. For example, a decline in
the trend in productivity of the labor
force would reduce the potential growth
rate of GDP—and trying to boost out-
put growth higher with accommodative
policy would only generate inflationary
pressures. In any event, monetary policy
cannot alter the natural rate of unem-
ployment, and any influence on poten-
tial output is at most secondary. As
European policymakers are learning,
reductions in high rates of structural
unemployment require regulatory
changes and increased competition.
But even if economists accept that it does
not make sense to set explicit fixed
numerical targets for real growth and
unemployment, the dual mandate still
puts equal weight on price stability and
maximum employment.
In the academic literature on inflation
targeting, a central bank that places sub-
stantial weight on both targets is referred
to as a “flexible inflation targeter.” As yet,
in my opinion, the proposals for flexi-
ble inflation targeting require further
we close the deviation between the un-
employment rate and the natural rate?”
The answer is complicated because it
involves the interaction between the time
frame for closing any gap between ac-
tual output and its maximum sustainable
level and the time frame for bringing
inflation in line with price stability. This
is because policy dilemmas may arise.
Suppose inflation is 1 percentage point
above its guideline. If output is above
potential, then there is no policy dilem-
ma, because a contractionary policy
aimed at both slowing output growth
and reducing inflation would make
progress on both objectives. But if out-
put is below potential, there is a conflict
in achieving both objectives. The infla-
tion gap points to raising rates, while
the output gap suggests lowering them.
Flexibility means that the central bank
must balance the two deviations; there-
fore, it would take longer to close either
gap in the second case than in the first.
And the larger the policy dilemma, the
longer it would take to close the gaps.
This discussion highlights the serious,
and unanswered, question of how to
specify formally such variable time peri-
ods in a policy environment with explicit
numerical guidelines. Even if this prob-
lem is solved, other issues then come
into play. As a legal matter, would the
Fed need approval from Congress to
adopt flexible targeting? And in lighthave successfully obtained one of the
most important benefits ascribed to a
regime based on formal guidelines.
Then what is it that distinguishes current
policy from simple discretionary ones
that have the potential to produce large
run-ups in inflation, like those in the
1970s? It is that central bankers now
know that even without rigid rules or
numerical guidelines, their actual ap-
proach to policy must be aimed at keep-
ing inflation expectations anchored at a
low level. They see this as a prerequisite
to achieving maximum sustainable
growth over the long run.7 Central
bankers also know that anchoring infla-
tionary expectations sometimes requires
preemptive policy tightening before the
actual inflation numbers start to rise—
moves that might prove unpopular with
the public, but are necessary to keep
inflation in check.
Conclusion
A lot of questions have been raised in this
article concerning inflation guidelines
and flexible targeting. There is not a
ultimately the well-being of consumers that
matters. For example, good business de-
cisions among intermediate goods produc-
ers ultimately benefit consumers through
their effect on final products and returns
to investors who are also consumers.
6 See, for example, Marvin Goodfriend, 2003,
“Inflation targeting in the United States,”
National Bureau of Economic Research,
working paper, No. 9981, September.
7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2006,
“Center focuses on issues related to price
stability,” 2005 Annual Report, available at
www.chicagofed.org/about_the_fed/
2005_annual_report_sidebar3.cfm.
1 An expanded version of this article was
published in the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago’s 2005 Annual Report, available
at www.chicagofed.org/about_the_fed/
annual_report.cfm. Charles Evans and
Spencer Krane contributed to the devel-
opment of these articles.
2 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2006,
“Selected central banks’ inflation guide-
lines,” 2005 Annual Report, available at
www.chicagofed.org/about_the_fed/
2005_annual_report_sidebar2.cfm.
3 The FOMC is responsible for setting the
short-term borrowing rate for banks,
thereby influencing the interest rates
banks offer to their customers.
pressing need to make a decision on
guidelines one way or the other. However,
the topic is one of the most important
issues currently on the table regarding
the appropriate strategies for conducting
monetary policy. There clearly are many
issues regarding guidelines and targeting
for researchers, business economists, and
policymakers to study and debate. And
this debate is definitely a healthy process.
No matter what answers surface, we will
learn more about the best ways to con-
duct monetary policy in our complicated
and ever changing economy.
4 See George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens,
and George L. Perry, 1996, “The macro-
economics of low inflation,” Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, Vol. 1996, No. 1, pp.
1–76. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry argue
that even though real wages determine
purchasing power, workers have an extra
aversion to seeing real wages lowered
through a reduction in nominal wages. The
authors calibrate a model in which an in-
flation rate of 3% allows most realignments
of real wages to occur without reducing
nominal wages.
5 Most central banks that have targets use a
consumer or retail index, and this has some
grounding in economic theory, since it is